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The rescaling of sub-national planning: Can 
localism resolve England’s spatial planning 
conundrum? 
 
David McGuinness and John Mawson 
 
This paper analyses the recent reorganisation of sub-national planning in England. The abrupt 
termination in 2010 of regional spatial strategies (RSSs) left England as the only major country in north-
western Europe without effective sub-national governance structures (outside London) for spatial 
planning. Drawing on in-depth interviews with public-sector planners and other research material, 
this paper analyses the impacts of the demise of regional planning for ‘larger-than-local’ policy 
coordination in England. The paper seeks to question whether localism can succeed where regionalism 
is perceived to have failed in dealing effectively with the strategic spatial dilemmas integral to planning. 
It concludes by assessing whether the evolving decentralised forms of sub-national governance 
(combined authorities and local enterprise partnerships (LEPs)) emerging through the government’s 
‘devolution revolution’ can develop to fill the current strategic planning void and resurrect some form 
of spatial planning throughout England. 
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This article explores the ongoing ramifications of the decision in 2010 to 
revoke regional spatial strategies (RSSs) in England. This decision expunged the 
drive towards long-term coordinated strategic spatial planning from the 
sub-national  governance process. Building on prior research by Pemberton 
and Morphet (2013), Baker and Wong (2013), Boddy and Hickman (2013) 
and Roodbol-Mekkes and Van den Brink (2015), the paper investigates the 
unfolding impacts of the reforms of land-use planning in England and 
considers whether some form of spatial planning will return to the English 
system. In this context Roodbol-Mekkes and Van den Brink (2015, 185) argue, 
‘In spatial planning the concept of rescaling has been used in a more narrow 
sense [than in wider economic geography literature] to analyse the 
redistribution of powers and responsibilities between the various tiers of 
government or the rise and fall of various tiers in spatial planning.’ 
The paper critiques the de facto strategic spatial planning vacuum that was 
created by the coalition government in removing the regional tier of 
planning and moving to a more localist approach to planning which aims to 
 bring power closer to local people. Drawing on in-depth interviews it 
explores practitioner’s responses to the decommissioning of spatial 
planning and the effectiveness of policies that have subsequently been 
introduced to facilitate ‘large-than-local’ cooperation (i.e. the duty to 
cooperate). 
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It proceeds to consider the potential of evolving decentralised governance 
spaces to fill the strategic spatial planning void and facilitate the return of 
forms of spatial planning to the currently dislocated English planning system. 
Gallant et al. (2013, 569) question whether the new localist system of 
planning in England allows government to deal effectively with the strategic 
dilemmas integral to governing. Evidence provided in this paper and in other 
studies (Boddy and Hickman, 2013; Pugalis and Townsend, 2013 and Roodbol-
Mekkes and Van den Brink, 2015) suggests that strategic dilemmas (e.g. the 
distribution of strategic housing allocations between neighbouring 
authorities, major infrastructure projects and responses to climate change) 
are unlikely to be effectively addressed via the existing duty to cooperate. 
This duty was introduced via the Localism Act (2011). It is a statutory 
requirement for neighbouring local authorities to collaborate and is assessed 
upon submission of a local plan for examination by the Planning Inspectorate. 
In England, new sub-national governance approaches (particularly combined 
authorities) are emerging which may gradually ‘fill in’ elements of the strategic 
spatial planning void in parts of the country. However, the present 
asymmetrical development of combined authorities is generating concerns 
of fragmentation in spatial planning coverage, creating ‘a patchwork quilt’ of 
governance approaches, which may accentuate existing economic 
inequalities between localities in England (Colomb and Tomaney, 2015). 
In order to address the above issues, the background research involved two 
steps: a desk-based analysis of literature relating to the abolition of regional 
planning and a review and analysis of the subsequent spatial policy void, 
followed by a survey involving semi-structured interviews with planners in 
all eight core cities and a sample of planners from twelve (of the twenty-six) 
key cities in England. The twenty semi- structured interviews took place 
between March and September 2014. To maintain anonymity for 
respondents they were identified by a generic job title and location (e.g. 
 Planner, North East). The paper begins by providing some context about the 
history of regional planning in England. 
 
 
The rise and fall of regional planning in England 
 
Regional planning has experienced ‘a mercurial and often ephemeral’ 
history in post-war England (Wannop, 1995, x). Until the turmoil unleashed 
by the Thatcher governments in the early 1980s, there was a degree of 
political consensus about the need to address regional imbalances with the 
focus on floor-space controls and regional financial assistance to encourage 
the relocation of largely manufacturing employment from the then 
prosperous regions of the Midlands and South to government-designated 
development areas in the North and West. In parallel within regions, public 
policy addressed congestion and urban regeneration via housing overspill and 
the construction of  new towns within the framework of  joint central–local 
government regional strategies (Hall, 1973). Wannop (1995, xv) summarises 
two distinct forms of regional planning: ‘the balancing of resources to 
modify standards of living and disparities in economic conditions … 
between different parts of the nation’ (which we define as regional 
economic planning) and ‘intra-regional planning’ (which will be the primary 
focus of this paper), an approach which ‘attempts to resolve issues and local 
problems of growing metropolitan cities, spilling their population and their 
economic and social relationships and raising political disputes across their 
administrative boundaries’. Some commentators (Tewdwr-Jones and 
Allmendinger, 2007, 30) argue that reincarnation of regional planning under 
New Labour introduced a less prescriptive form of regional planning, 
focusing on ‘economic competitiveness and growth within a neo-liberal 
framework of supporting the market rather than supplanting it’. English 
regional planning (in its varying forms) has experienced its zenith during 
periods of Labour administration, where the terms ‘regional’ and ‘spatial’ 
planning have become conflated within some political and professional 
perspectives, as ‘top-down’ governance, redistribution and 
interventionistism. In contrast, Haughton and Allmendinger (2012, 3) argue 
that in much of continental Europe, spatial planning is seen as ‘a 
progressive largely technical movement’, rather than being linked overtly to 
political agendas. 
The current vacuum in strategic planning in England was initiated by the 
(former) Secretary of State, Eric Pickles, who used the Localism Act (2011) to 
rescale sub-national governance and remove (in his view) a costly and 
bureaucratic tier of governance. He stated, ‘I’ve set about abolishing all the 
 Rs. Regional Spatial Strategies, Regional Housing Targets, Regional 
Assemblies, Government Offices for the Regions and Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) … The arbitrary regional tier of government 
administration and bureaucracy was unpopular, ineffective and 
inefficient’ (Pickles, 2010, n.p.).’ During the post-war era the application of 
English planning policy has occurred within the context of several centrally 
determined changes in the structure and processes of local government, 
notably the setting up and abolition of metropolitan councils, the 
establishment of district councils and the creation of unitary authorities. 
Pemberton and Morphet (2013) state that the churn within governance 
approaches occurs partly due to the philosophy and ideological stance of the 
national government of the day, combined with ‘system shifts’ which often 
relate to a response to economic crisis when the priority may become 
supporting macroeco-nomic policies, subordinating social and 
environmental imperatives and reorganising local government. Upon the 
demise of RSSs (and with the prior demise of structure plans), a fundamental 
component of the post-war architecture of statutory land-use planning had 
been extracted from the system in England. Pugalis and Townsend (2013) 
state that in most mainland western European countries, stable structured 
systems of ‘meso’-level government and statutory legal powers enshrined 
in federal (and other) constitutional arrangements provide a more 
embedded approach and greater continuity in their ‘larger-than-local’ 
planning approaches. This also makes it significantly harder for an incoming 
government to eradicate a tier of governance as happened in England in 
2010. 
Situating the recent reorganisation of  sub-national governance in England 
within a wider European context, Olesen (2014) and Roodbol-Mekkes and 
Van den Brink (2015) identify a growing neo-liberal turn in terms of 
downgrading strategic spatial planning across many north-western 
European countries, with neo-liberal ‘development-oriented’ agendas 
prioritising economic growth and the competitiveness of cities becoming the 
default position. Olesen (2014) and Roodbol-Mekkes and Van den Brink (2015) 
identify England as the outlier in terms of its almost complete eradication of 
sub-national governance structures for strategic spatial planning (outside 
London), but find a comparable trajectory away from spatial planning in 
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. Olesen (2014, 293) associates this shift 
in several north-west European countries with the growth of planning 
scepticism, which began during the regulatory 1980s when planning systems 
were dismantled due to ‘roll-back neo-liberalism’. 
 Regional spatial strategies in England were created during the second term 
(2001–2005) of the Labour Administration (1997–2010). In 2004 the 
Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act replaced the previous cooperative 
and advisory approach to regional planning and made spatial planning a legal 
requirement. Pemberton and Morphet (2013, 2021) state that the 2004 Act 
spurred the ‘shift away from land-use planning to a broader leadership vision 
around “place shaping” and integrated delivery’. Gallent et al. (2013, 564) 
describe a significant statutory (and interventionist) shift from a system 
where ‘local development planning needed to “have regard” to the content 
of regional plans, to a system of required compliance’. The theoretical 
drivers behind Labour’s version of spatial planning sought to achieve 
strategic integration of local development documents between 
neighbouring authorities and to coordinate a wider range of public policies 
and public expenditure systems within the context of place making (Mawson 
et al., 2005). Regional spatial planning was designed to provide a form of 
institutional cohesion, ‘joining up’ efforts to respond to larger-than-local 
issues like strategic housing allocations, environmental pressures and major 
infrastructure projects, which due to their scale and complexity transcend 
local administrative boundaries. Spatial planning was an ambitious agenda 
and contrasted significantly with the more confined regulatory land-use 
planning approach of the previous two decades (Haughton et al., 2009). As 
the 2010 election approached, the RSS process was regarded by its critics as 
achieving only modest success in attempts to facilitate joined-up 
government. However, research commissioned for the collec- tive body of 
regional assemblies (English Regions Network (ERN)) found that not all 
Whitehall departments were ‘on board’ in making the necessary 
adjustments to introduce greater coordination of public policies and 
expenditure within the regions (Mawson and Snape, 2005). 
 
 
The political dimension of the demise of regional planning 
 
The termination of RSSs had been widely touted by the Conservatives in 
opposition. Successive Green Papers (Conservative Party, 2009; 2010) stated 
that regional planning would be revoked. Amongst stakeholders there was a 
mixed reaction to the demise of RSSs (and the lack of an alternative), and 
the decision generated consternation within elements of the academic, 
professional and planning communities. Tewdwr- Jones (2012, 133) criticised 
the Conservative’s ‘myopic’ critique of RSSs, focusing on contentious issues of 
housing targets and ‘not the wider economic, environmental, infrastructure 
 or strategic integration matters’ that RSSs engaged with. In contrast, some 
Conservative politicians (particularly at the local level in southern England) 
were delighted to witness the demise of what they perceived as profoundly 
‘undemocratic’ and top-down regional planning. However, Mawson (2007) 
seeks to qualify this viewpoint given that two-thirds of seats on regional 
assemblies which oversaw the development of RSSs were held by local 
politicians from across the region concerned. Gallent et al. (2013, 564) observe 
that, historically, regional planning had performed two functions, as a 
‘counterbalance to the risk of local interests subverting planning’s broader 
purpose’  and as  a  shield to  deflect  politically damaging  criticism  about 
strategic ‘greater-good’ decisions (particularly major housing developments)  
from local politicians. Upon the demise of RSSs, local authorities were now 
responsible for determining their own housing needs without a strategic 
mechanism for resolving with their neighbours the location of excess housing 
demand and politicians no longer had the regional tier to shelter them from 
criticisms. Indeed, the local government ‘leaders’ of a number of regional 
assemblies were prepared to admit in private to ERN-commissioned 
researchers the value of the assemblies in providing a powerful negotiating 
device with central government over housing numbers and securing additional 
infrastructure support (Mawson, 2006). 
It would be disingenuous to portray the demise of regional planning in 
England as solely a partisan decision by an incoming administration with a 
divergent ideology to that of its predecessors. Mawson (2007) notes that the 
prior Labour era was characterised by significant tension within government 
between supporters of a regional approach (the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister) and supporters of a city-region approach (the Treasury). Boddy and 
Hickman (2013, 745) identify the 2007 Treasury Sub-national Review of 
Economic Development and Regeneration as the point where supporters of a 
city-region approach within government began to exert control in this 
Whitehall tussle. The review contained an ‘increasing emphasis on sub-
regional, city-region focus and started to question European-style planning 
at regional scale’. The Labour government subsequently transferred the 
responsibility for preparing a ‘single regional strategy’ to the RDAs and a 
council ‘leaders’ board’, although these arrangements were swiftly followed 
by a change in government (Pearce and Mawson, 2009). The 2007 Sub-
national Review also introduced multi-area agreements (MAAs) as innovative 
‘soft governance mechanisms’ to promote collaboration across local 
authority boundaries (Pemberton and Morphet, 2013). MAAs can be seen as a 
proto- type for the current combined-authorities model (which is discussed 
later in the paper). 
 Against the background of the dismantling of Labour’s spatial planning 
frame- work and our analysis and interpretation of these developments, 
the article turns to the reflections of practitioners working in the field of 
strategic planning on this marked policy shift. The views of these twenty 
senior English local authority planners about the effectiveness of RSSs 
broadly fell into three categories, those who valued RSSs and were opposed 
to its revocation (thirteen), those who were neutral about the demise of RSSs 
(six) and those who welcomed the demise of RSSs (one). 
The majority (twelve) felt that although RSSs ‘were by no means perfect’ 
and to some extent could be criticised for being top-down and 
cumbersome to develop initially, they were a useful vehicle ‘to get all 
stakeholders involved, allowing tricky spatial planning decision to be 
resolved’ (Planner, West Midlands). Several (six) of the planners made 
related comments about the new and innovative RSS process being 
‘painful’ during its long gestation, but only really realising the value of RSSs 
in hindsight: ‘whilst it was a lengthy and painful process, it was important 
and we miss it’ (Planner, North West). Concerns aired by planners during the 
research about the current difficulty of engaging with a strategic ‘larger-
than-local’ approach to planning correlate with Gallent et al.’s (2013, 569) 
observation that the downscaling of planning may cause some authorities to 
‘lose sight of broader and longer-term objectives’. 
Critical points were raised about the politicisation of regional planning in 
England since 2010. Some respondents felt that the concept of regional 
spatial planning was valuable in terms of an inclusive approach to 
governance and to negotiating controversial spatial planning issues like the 
development and location of major infrastructure projects. However, such 
mediation was made more difficult without the region-wide structure of 
decision making that accompanied it. It was commented that under the 
local planning regime it would be more difficult since ‘ultimately there are 
compromises and everyone has to have their fair share … it’s not regional 
planning in its purest form’ (Planner, North East). 
Most planners were sceptical about whether the rescaling of the system 
to a localist approach would be more effective at mediating political 
conflicts between communities of interest and long-term spatial 
objectives because of the tensions between strategic priorities and local 
political pragmatism. A respondent from the West Midlands articulated a 
prevalent view that localism might prove a chimera: ‘A lot of local 
authorities felt they were going to get more control of the scale and 
location of development with the removal of RSS … the reality is that under 
localism, duty to cooperate and objectively assessed housing need … 
 things could get worse.’ The dominant view (eighteen) was that the 
removal of RSSs had been a political decision, based on dogma – ‘payback’ 
for Conservative councillors and an element of austerity pragmatism. Regional 
planning appears to have been partially blighted by a change in government 
and an associated shift in underlying political values. The issue of different 
perspectives of  the regional approach  at  the  national  level  was  articulated 
strongly in the interviews: ‘Conservatives associate regionalism with top-down 
socialist planning, tied in with a strand of anti-European thinking;  we  are  not  
a country of regions we are a country of shire councils’ (Planner, East of 
England). This identification of an anti-European dimension within 
Conservative ideology corresponds with Tewdwr-Jones et al. (2010, 246) 
observation that regional planning has been interpreted by some 
commentators as the ‘Europeanization’ of UK planning, which ultimately sought 
to create a Europe of the regions.  This may be another reason why regional 
planning is held in such contempt by many Conservatives. Over three-quarters 
of the  planners  (seventeen)  felt  that  the  Secretary  of  State’s  revocation of 
RSSs was injudicious, and a number of respondents queried the wisdom of 
revoking RSSs  without  establishing  an  alternative  approach:  ‘There  is  an  
element of dogma, in the way they  were  abolished,  announcement  made,  
challenges  made, then a retraction. Rather than thinking through what a  
replacement  system  might look like’ (Planner, East Midlands). A planner from 
the South East added context to the orthodox thesis that RSSs were ultimately 
scrapped because of the imposition of perceived top-down housing targets: ‘It 
was purely politically, to do  with  the  South East and predominately 
Conservative councillors. It wasn’t the regional assembly and it wasn’t regional 
planning, it was the National Housing Advisory Unit … they were seen to be 
imposing very large, potentially very damaging, housing numbers on South East 
authorities’ (Planner, South East). Prominent amongst the respondents that 
felt RSSs were not fit for purpose or were neutral about RSSs was a strong 
representation of Yorkshire and Humber authorities:1 ‘Regional assemblies,  
producing  documents which don’t seem to be delivering much but loads of 
people are moaning about them. Government must think, “if we can get rid 
of them and save money, would anyone miss them?”’ (Planner, Yorkshire and 
Humber). Yorkshire and Humber was the region which produced the most 
comments during the interviews about ill-fitting (artificial) regional boundaries 
and a lack of cohesion with the economic geography of  cities. It is difficult to 
conclusively ascertain whether these issues have soured opinions about RSSs, 
                                                          
1 Some respondents stated that the Yorkshire and Humber region was ‘too big and made little economic or 
political sense’. 
 but they do suggest strong political tensions within this standard region. 
This seems to be confirmed by the difficulties which local government in the 
Yorkshire and Humber former planning region have experienced in agreeing 
(amongst themselves) an appropriate geographical basis for negotiating 
combined authorities with central government. Comments from respondents 
about the asymmetry of strategic fit created  by  inflexible  regional  
administrative  boundaries  support  Baker  and  Wong’s (2013, 92) observations 
of a strategic conundrum inherent in spatial planning relating to the lack of 
workable institutional structures. 
 
 
The policy implications of the abolition of RSSs 
 
The abrupt revocation of RSSs led to a legal challenge, Cala Homes (South) 
Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (2010),2 which 
upheld the view that the decision to revoke the policy by the Secretary of 
State had been premature.3 Despite the controversy over revocation, 
Allmendinger and Haughton (2013, 954) contend that regional spatial 
planning was ‘an unstable fix and one only ever likely to be a temporary 
phenomenon’. This can be attributed in part to a powerful local government 
lobby which resented the imposition of a ‘meso-tier’ tier of strategic planning 
and a government ideologically opposed to the approach. Swain et al. (2013) 
highlight the ‘received wisdom’ of a number of weaknesses in Labour’s 
regional spatial planning system: 
1 democratic deficit and lack of regional autonomy;  
2 insufficient inter-regional coordination; 
3 separation of economic planning from spatial planning;  
4 imposition of high (top-down) regional housing targets; 
5 RSS became too detailed and strayed beyond appropriate influence of 
regional planning; and 
6 preparation of plans overly long and complex. 
In the case of the ‘democratic deficit’, however, the regional assemblies did 
enable a range of regional stakeholders from private, voluntary and civic 
society to formally engage in the spatial planning process, whilst at the same 
                                                          
2 Cala Homes successfully appealed against the Secretary of State’s guidance to revoke RSSs; eventually 
revoked March 2013. 
 
3 In revoking RSSs the Secretary of  State had not given appropriate consideration to statutory 
European obliga- tions (Strategic Environmental Assessment). 
 
 time senior local authority representatives retained the majority vote on 
all statutory planning matters (Snape and Mawson, 2004). This is in marked 
contrast to the current arrangements for the combined authorities. Further, 
a more detailed exploration of the evidence submitted in various official 
reports considered as part of the Review of Sub-national Economic 
Development and Regeneration (HM Treasury et al., 2007) suggests a more 
measured critique of the RSS sub-national governance model which reveals 
more effective working relationships than implied in Swain et al. (2013) 
(Audit Commission, 2005; DCLG, 2006; HM Treasury, 2006; 2007). 
The Labour approach of transferring planning powers to regional 
structures set in train what Haughton et al. (2009, 5) describe as new ‘soft 
spaces’ of governance, ‘involving the multiplicity of newly created sub-
national spatial identities around which new understandings of spatial 
development possibilities are being created’. The RSSs, in association with 
the regional-assemblies approach, brought new actors and a reassertion of 
the importance of a partnership approach to strategic planning, but there 
was no easy path to mediate intractable conflicts between local politics and 
the more strategic ‘greater-good’ drivers of spatial planning. Ultimately, the 
Labour regional planning experiment was perceived by powerful critics in 
central and local government as being incapable of facilitating economic 
growth (particularly housing development and coordinating transport 
policy). An alternative interpretation of the period would suggest that the 
Labour government failed to impose its original aim to require the 
coordination of spatial investment by government departments and 
quangos. The concept of democratic regional governance, incorporating a 
strong strategic regional planning function, was never fully supported by 
senior figures in the Labour government (Mawson, 2007), and institutional 
regionalism lost political credibility after the North East Referendum in 2004.4 
Post-2004, the Labour government retained elements of functional 
regionalism via the RSSs and Regional Economic Strategies (RESs), but it 
began to explore forms of city-region and sub-regional planning initially 
through the work of the RDAs. The 2007 Labour government White Paper 
Communities in Control: Real People, Real Power can be seen as a forerunner of 
aspects of the coalition’s localism agenda, and it shares many central themes 
                                                          
4 In November 2004, 78 per cent of voters (turnout was 48 per cent) opposed a North East regional 
assembly. Advocates of reform argue that the Labour government’s proposals did not offer the electorate 
sufficient powers and resources to justify the establishment of a new ‘meso’ tier of government. 
 
 
 within an omnipresent neo-liberal discourse. At the end of the decade, with 
the formation of the coalition government and the bonfire of regional 
structures, the English planning system was about to be fundamentally 
rescaled back towards a more development- oriented regulatory approach, 
notwithstanding the optional introduction of (a micro level) of 
neighbourhood planning. 
 
 
Is the duty to cooperate capable of filling the strategic planning 
void? 
 
These changes posited the transference of any residual strategic planning to 
a new or alternative tier of governance. In the event, post-revocation of the 
RSSs, local plans have functioned largely in the absence of a strategic planning 
framework. Baker and Wong (2013, 96) note ‘a serious institutional void 
between the need for some forms of strategic spatial planning and the 
government’s localized approach to plan-making’. In this void the incoming 
government installed the ‘duty to cooperate’, which requires local planning 
authorities to undertake ‘meaningful discussions’ with neighbouring 
authorities around strategic planning issues. There was, however, no 
clarification forthcoming from government about what constitutes  
‘meaningful  discussions’. The government’s streamlined planning guidance, 
the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (DCLG, 2012) makes clear that 
an up-to-date local plan is the statutory planning document against which 
planning applications should be judged. In terms of the wider strategic 
function of planning (formerly covered by RSSs), the NPPF is largely silent, 
stating that ‘public bodies have a duty to co-operate on planning issues that 
cross administrative boundaries’ (DCLG, 2012, para. 44). This parsimonious 
level of detail about how local planning authorities (LPAs) should 
collaborate in developing a coordinated vision for the ‘larger than local’ has 
led to claims of a ‘planning fudge’. Ultimately, the duty to cooperate is a weak 
requirement to consult neighbouring authorities and not a compulsion for local 
authorities to agree about cross-boundary priorities. The duty has been 
criticised as a ‘voluntary and light-touch’ form of strategic planning (Swain 
et al. 2013, xvi). Boddy and Hickman (2013) concur, stating the duty lacks 
teeth where local communities and authorities do not wish to collaborate 
or wish to take a unilateral (negative) stance to development. The resultant 
confusion relating to the duty is cited as the catalyst for many draft local 
plans failing at the examination stage (e.g. Aylesbury Vale). The arbiter of 
effective consultation between neighbouring local authorities has become 
 national planning inspectors at the examination stage of the preparation of 
the local plan. The growing influence of planning inspectors and the courts 
has sparked concerns about a fragmented era of ‘appeal and court-driven 
planning’, contrary to the ethos of ‘localism’ as a quasi-judicial approach 
which generates a loss of local democratic input into the planning process 
(TCPA, 2015, 13). 
When asked about policies which have been developed to mitigate the 
removal of spatial planning, there was an almost unequivocal negative 
response from respondents (planners) about the effectiveness of the duty 
to cooperate. ‘Naive to expect it to work in the South East … to expect 
anybody to take other authorities’ housing numbers is unrealistic’ 
(Planner, South East). And, ‘if you set off with a blank sheet of paper to 
devise an approach to strategic planning, you wouldn’t come up with the 
duty to cooperate’ (Planner, West Midlands). Respondents reported 
concern about the lack of initial guidance from central government 
about the duty and how to achieve satisfactory levels of cooperation 
between authorities: ‘put into the legislation as a duty, without much 
explanation about what it meant and how it was supposed to operate … 
we have all been making it up as we go along informed by various 
decisions of inspectors and the courts’ (Planner, South East). Interviewees 
held divergent opinions about the seriousness with which LPAs were 
approaching the duty to cooperate: ‘we will all find cosmetic ways to say we 
have done it’ (Planner, South West). At the other end of the spectrum there 
was serious concern expressed about the growing tendency for policy to 
be clarified by planning inspectors: ‘many authorities have had local plans 
fall down at inspection, due to failures in the duty to cooperate. It wasn’t 
spelt out well enough in the first place!’ (Planner, South East). There was 
also concern about the perceived lack of consistency with inspectors’ 
decisions: ‘some of the inspectors’ decisions that are coming through 
aren’t that consistent’ (Planner, North West). A planner from the South 
East encapsulated the sentiments of the majority of planners who were 
interviewed about the longer-term impact of the duty: ‘The duty has not 
adequately filled the void left by regional planning; the consequences are 
less structured development and more planning by appeal’ (Planner, South 
East). These views support Boddy and Hickman’s (2013, 759) analysis that 
the duty to cooperate is a ‘highly restricted’ version of strategic planning 
when compared with the historic role of structure plans and RSSs, which is 
of particular concern at a time of national housing shortage. 
Fundamental questions were also raised by planners about whether the 
duty to cooperate fitted with a localism narrative or whether it was a 
 covert form of centralism: ‘On the one hand they say, make it up yourself 
… then they say your plan is unsound because you have not done what 
we wanted you to do, it’s actually more centralisation’ (Planner, North 
East). The government has recently acknowledged failings within the 
present system, stating that existing guidance relating to the duty to 
cooperate will be strengthened, ‘to ensure that housing and infrastructure 
needs are identified and planned for’ (HM Treasury, 2015, 45). However, 
the majority of planners inter- viewed were unconvinced that localism via 
the duty to cooperate is a positive step in delivering coordinated strategic 
planning responses across administrative boundaries. There were some 
positive examples of existing collaboration between local authorities 
highlighted, but it is unclear to what extent these arrangements have 
been facilitated by the present localism narrative. They appeared to be 
largely based on pre-existing links, a track record of working together 
between local authorities and/or pragmatic decisions to collaborate in a 
climate of austerity. Examples highlighted included joint planning 
arrangements in the East Midlands established since the Planning & 
Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 that have endured because of their 
statutory status (PAS, 2015), and joint planning initiatives between 
authorities around the Hull conurbation driven by economic development 
imperatives. 
 
 
‘Rescaling’ from regionalism to localism 
 
Localism has been heralded by successive UK governments as a panacea to re-
engage the wider electorate with the planning process and as an antidote 
to opposition to development. However, beyond the alluring rhetoric, 
Allmendinger and Haughton (2011, 314) warn of localism approaches ‘with 
thinly disguised libertarian political agendas to reduce State influence’. 
Davoudi and Madanipour (2013, 560) expand on the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of 
localism, describing a concept simultaneously capable of illustrating 
‘exclusionary and regressive’ and ‘inclusive, innovative and transformative 
forms’. Localism is therefore an extremely malleable concept which can take 
multiple forms. Against this background the paper now turns to explore 
the government’s narrative surrounding the transference of planning powers 
to the local level and investigates the degree to which this is actively the case. 
Roodbol-Mekkes and Van den Brink (2015, 186) state that where rescaling 
takes place in  planning,  it  invariably  must  include  ‘the  two,  often  concurrent,  
processes of centralisation and decentralisation – the movement of tasks in an 
upward and downward direction’. Within the English system the transfer of 
 some planning functions down to the local scale has coincided with muscular 
centralising initiatives from national government. This  is,  perhaps,  to  
counterbalance  the  parochial  political tendencies often inherent in localist 
approaches and to protect the omnipresent thrust for economic growth. The 
government has tried to entice communities and authorities to accept new 
development with financial incentives like the New Homes Bonus whilst  
simultaneously  attempting  to  underpin  growth  by  requiring  all  LPAs to 
facilitate challenging land supply targets for housing, or lose their  discretionary 
scrutiny role over development. Pugalis and Townsend (2013, 107) state 
that prior attempts at rescaling governance in England have  involved  
‘concentration  in  larger units, including innovations to fill the “missing middle” 
between the local and the national’. In contrast, the recent rescaling of 
planning has extracted altogether the regional spatial approach, seen as a 
restrictive, bureaucratic, top-down process, but without an alternative effective 
mechanism to address critical cross-boundary opportunities and  challenges,  
offering  instead  what  might  be  described  as  fuzzy  notions of collaborative 
localism. The subliminal  development-oriented  economic  imperatives within 
the NPPF  are  evidence  that  despite  the  populist  rhetoric  of  localism, the  
English  planning  system  ultimately  still  functions  as  a  regulatory  system,  
with a strong central drive to deregulate planning to facilitate economic growth. 
Recent critiques of the government’s brand of localism suggest  that  it  proffers  
responsibility without commensurate resources (McGuinness et al., 2014), 
whilst facilitating shrinkage of the state,  enabling  the  government  ‘to  deny  
responsibility  for  failure and to claim any success’  (Allmendinger  and  
Haughton,  2011,  314).  Allmendinger and Haughton (2011) observe that as 
localism has gained traction in England it has reinforced a crude dualism 
which states ‘“local” good, “national government” bad’. In planning terms 
the localism approach prioritises  the  local  statutory  development process 
(within the regulatory framework of a centrally determined NPPF), expunging 
remaining regional approaches and offering an optional tier of neighbourhood 
planning (see Gallent and Robinson, 2012). 
 
 
Emerging soft spaces of governance: local enterprise partnerships 
and combined authorities 
 
The paper now moves on to consider emerging sub-national governance 
structures which have evolved since the end of the Labour government in 
2010. The demise of regionalism and the rescaling to city-regions and 
localism has heralded another chapter in the volatile evolution of sub-
 national governance in England. The state has to resolve the conundrum of 
how to effectively reform sub-national governance structures which reflect 
the political and economic realities in complex rural, dispersed urban and 
often polycentric city-regions. Hall (2013, 3) states, ‘The individual city or 
town is no longer an adequate framework to understand or plan for the 
future’. It is evident that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ spatial approach to sub-national 
governance in Britain is problematic due to the country’s complex political 
and physical geography. 
Under its devolution agenda, the government is not inclined to be 
prescriptive about a preferred approach to strategic planning and 
governance, preferring to task neighbouring authorities to come up with 
governance solutions that will be effective for their locality (House of 
Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, 2016). The 
government maintains that the duty to cooperate was not designed as a 
proxy measure to replace RSSs. A solution to the deficiencies of the duty 
may be emerging in some localities (e.g. Greater Manchester and the West 
Midlands), involving the existing institutional vehicles which have been 
created to enable groupings of local authorities to work collaboratively, via 
combined authorities and local enterprise partnerships (LEPs). The combined-
authorities approach is a form of earned autonomy whereby consortia of 
local authorities must conduct a governance review and then can join 
together to form combined authorities; they can then develop a proposal to 
government that, if successful, will allow additional control of aspects of policy 
areas like economic development and skills and transport policies. Combined 
authorities in metropolitan areas can apply to expand their powers, but in 
exchange they must establish an elected mayor (Sandford, 2015). The primary 
driver for local authorities’ creating combined authorities appears to be 
financial, including the lure of a combined funding pot and greater autonomy 
over decisions for economic development, skills policies and transport 
infrastructure. Strategic planning appears to currently be a secondary priority 
for the majority of ‘devolution deal’ negotiations taking place with 
government. However, within the Cities and Local Government Devolution 
Act (2016) the Secretary of State has reserved the right to devolve further 
powers (e.g. strategic planning) to combined authorities and this may prove to 
be one next step in their evolution. 
At the outset of this research (2014), LEPs appeared to offer a pragmatic 
interim medium to reinvigorate some form of spatial planning (Pemberton 
and Morphet, 2013; Pugalis and Townsend, 2013). There are currently thirty-
nine LEPs of varying sizes in England, with some LPAs inhabiting more than one 
LEP boundary. However, a recent RTPI (2015, 2) study states that LEPs ‘lack 
 clarity in terms of their role in the planning system’. The LEPs have absorbed 
elements of the economic strategy role that was formerly delivered by the 
RDAs via the development of non-statutory economic plans known as 
strategic economic plans (SEPs). However, it remains unclear where, if at all, 
this leaves the environmental and social pillars of strategic planning that were 
integral components of the holistic RSSs approach under Labour. 
In terms of the potential for LEPs to engage in strategic planning, a 
number of recurrent issues were raised during the interviews, including a 
clear democratic deficit, lack of capacity within LEP teams, lack of desire for 
LEPs to go beyond their economic remit and a reluctance from the private 
sector to become mired in intractable strategic planning issues: ‘LEPs could 
have a role in identifying a framework for planning issues; the difficulty is 
LEPs have an economic focus rather than one geared around 
environmental or inequality issues’ (Planner, Yorkshire & Humber). The 
perceived myopic economic focus of the majority of LEPs was a feature 
of the interviews, and the overriding view was that under the current 
disjointed structure of sub-national governance combined authorities 
would be a more suitable forum for addressing strategic planning issues, 
such as reviewing green belt policy. The Great Birmingham and Solihull LEP 
(GBSLEP) was highlighted as innovative in that it had been directly involved 
with local government in the development of a strategic spatial plan which 
was designed to dovetail with the strategic economic plan. The Planner 
interviewed from the West Midlands commented, ‘We produced the 
strategic plan in a true partnership way, with topic groups led by … the 
private sector, under the RSS that would have never happened.’ The Spatial 
Plan for Recovery and Growth (SPRG) will draw together the main elements 
of the individual local plans from the nine GBSLEP local authorities. It was 
suggested that this approach might present a model for other areas. 
However, the interviewee from the West Midlands acknowledged that the 
‘crunch’ was yet to come in negotiating difficult decisions about the scale 
and distribution of growth for housing and employment sites in a LEP area 
which encompassed nine local authorities. Earlier attempts at central–local 
government inter-agency economic and spatial planning in the West 
Midlands and elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s have identified a tendency 
for individual partners to seek to maximise their own resource gains and 
autonomy whilst fudging intractable issues surrounding the location of 
housing overspill (Mawson and Skelcher, 1980). Moreover, while Greater 
Birmingham and Greater Manchester may appear to be relatively stable 
city-regions, it remains to be seen whether this model of governance can be 
effective, especially in localities where there are deeply contested 
 boundaries and polycentric power struggles between cities and related 
localities. 
The government appears relaxed about an era where spatially varied 
decentralisation outcomes are agreed in terms of  the range of  powers a 
combined authority can hold, with spatial planning appearing to be an 
option (enabling the creation of statutory spatial strategies). It seems 
content for an iterative approach to decentralisation to evolve via ad hoc 
deals across England. The Secretary of State recently stated, ‘rather than 
having administrative tidiness … it’s going to look like how England is… a 
combination of different places’ (Clarke, 2015). Theoretically, there is 
synergy between the Government’s laissez-faire approach to sub-national 
decentralisation and Deas’s (2013) concept of ‘creative chaos’, which 
engenders a free-market competitive ethos between localities, a process 
where winners are perceived as innovators and successful places. Creating 
a funding climate which requires strong political leadership and robust 
organisational capacity at the local level to succeed does raise concerns 
about the future of localities which are lagging and do not possess the 
political and organisational attributes to succeed in this competitive 
environment. Nonetheless, this competitive approach which central 
government appears to trust will spur creativity amongst authorities and 
drive the new leaner local state, and this multi-speed approach to the 
evolution of sub-national governance structures is rapidly evolving. There 
is much detail that needs to be clarified before the impact of this approach 
can be ascer-tained, particularly impacts on perceived ‘failing’ localities. 
At the time of finalising the paper there were five agreed combined 
authorities,5 with over thirty further collaborations of authorities 
submitting expressions of interest to central government to progress 
devolution proposals.6 The benchmark combined authority under the new 
governance arrangements is Greater Manchester, and the Greater 
Manchester Agreement, announced in 2014, empowers the city- region 
‘to create a statutory spatial framework for the city-region’ subject to 
unanimous approval by the ten local authority leaders and the Greater 
Manchester mayor (who form the combined authority cabinet) (Sandford, 
2015). Subsequently, devolutions deals in West Yorkshire and the West 
Midlands do not contain powers for spatial planning, and the draft for 
the Sheffield deal did not initially include spatial planning although a 
                                                          
5 Combined authorities agreed by 2014: Greater Manchester, North East, West Yorkshire, Sheffield and 
Liverpool. Future combined authorities 2016–2017: Tees Valley, West Midlands and North Midlands. 
 
6 Thirty-four applications for devolution deals were submitted to government; six separate applications 
from within Yorkshire. 
 subsequent draft (October 2015) now includes comparable powers to 
those of Greater Manchester for spatial planning. The Teesside Combined 
Authority has also recently received approval for a non-statutory plan 
with a focus on land development. This suggests an era of fragmented and 
piece- meal approaches to spatial planning  emerging  across  England.  
This  research was completed when the concept of combined authorities 
was nascent; therefore this paper cannot provide comprehensive analysis 
of the evolution of combined authorities. However, the empirical data 
generated for this article do include practitioner’s views of  the potential 
influence of  combined authorities as a governance  approach and their 
potential to take on a greater strategic planning role. Planners were 
concerned about perceptions that combined authorities meant further 
depletion of planning staff, and there was a strong sentiment that the 
subliminal political drivers for combined authorities would be further 
rationalisation of public services and a push to combine dwindling 
resources at the local level: ‘Combined authorities is a process driven by 
national perceptions, of how local authorities work, resource needs, 
efficiency and savings, rather than being driven by the best 
organisational way to do things’ (Planner, Yorkshire & Humber). This 
view echoes Pugalis and Townsend’s (2013, 117) assertion that recent 
rescaling of governance in England ‘has more to do with the politics of 
dwindling public resources and ideological viewpoints than it does with 
locating a more appropriate spatial scale for the leader- ship and 
operation of sub-national planning’. 
There was a level of concern that  strategic  planning  (other  than  SEPs)  had 
been not been central enough in the initial negotiations around combined 
authorities: ‘Combined authorities look to be about economic development, 
transport and housing, not planning. The City Deal was a bribe basically, 
civil servants saying to ******** look at how well Manchester has done, if 
you go for a combined authority … we’ll give you money and freedoms’ 
(Planner, North West). A significant concern that planners repeatedly 
raised was a fear that local politics and city rivalries would intervene as 
some cities or towns might perceive that their identities are being eroded 
and in turn subvert the most effective technocratic (although not 
necessarily geopolitical) solution for devising combined authorities in 
terms of functional economic geography: ‘The push will be on for local 
authorities to join up to make best use of resources, but it doesn’t mean 
they will join with the local authorities that make most sense in terms of 
strategic planning’ (Planner, South East). There was clear anxiety from 
some planners that although government might be successful in the short 
term by cajoling local authorities to combine for enhanced autonomy, 
ultimately, historical political rivalries could implode and stymie the 
 longer-term prospects of the approach; many second-tier cities and towns 
were wary of being consumed within a ‘big-city’ brand.7 One interview 
stated he was sceptical about combined authorities due to ‘a lack of local 
political appetite for it’ (Planner, East Midlands). A number of comments 
were made about the calibre of municipal leadership present in Greater 
Manchester over the past two decades, together with common urban 
problems, and the predominant control of local councils by the Labour Party. 
Respondents warned about underestimating the importance of political 
capability and the presence of other positive local circumstances which 
encouraged neighbouring local authorities to go beyond lowest-common-
denominator politics: ‘Combined authorities will take time to mature … 
there is a danger you end up with lowest-common-denominator politics. 
Manchester has been successful but it has taken twenty years’ (Planner, North 
West). However, planners also noted that the stick of being excluded from 
access to funding had ‘focused minds’ beyond political squabbles and 
encouraged more strategic thinking. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Regional spatial planning in England during the Labour era proved 
problematic because of a seemingly intractable struggle between strong 
strategic planning (‘the greater good’) and vocal (political and community) 
interests within local democracy – a problem now faced by the localist model. 
Some critics argue the RSS model was stymied by their lack of formal 
democratic accountability due to Labour’s failure to establish an elected 
political tier at the meso (regional) level (Swain et al., 2013). In some regions 
the standard regions were criticised as providing the basis for statutory 
spatial planning when it was felt they did not adequately reflect functional 
economic areas and had not gained local political acceptance (Pugalis and 
Townsend, 2013; Baker and Wong, 2013). However, achieving a universally 
accepted institutional fix for sub-national governance has been a recurring 
quandary in England; Wannop (1995, 
xxi) sagely observed that ‘regional planning and governance can never be 
perfectly arranged, except in the moment’. The demise of RSSs and the 
subsequent rescaling of governance towards a localist approach 
undoubtedly left a strategic spatial planning void across much of England 
during the term of the coalition government. Hence Gallent et al.’s (2013) 
                                                          
7 Non-core city authorities within Merseyside and West Yorkshire fear becoming subsumed within a 
Greater Liverpool or Greater Leeds brand. 
 question – whether the new localist system of planning in England allows 
government to deal effectively with the strategic dilemmas integral to 
governing. The first five years of localism suggest that for most localities the 
answer is categorically negative. The duty to cooperate has clearly not 
evolved to fill the spatial planning void. The TCPA (2014, 2) recently described 
the state of sub-regional planning in England ‘as one of fragmentation and 
contrast’. Planning practitioners interviewed during this research were broadly 
supportive of the need for some form of spatial planning but recognised some 
of the limitations of the English RSS approach. Planners’ overriding concern 
was the unsuitability of the current institutional fix (duty to cooperate). 
After a period of stagnation in spatial planning the Conservative government 
appears to have recognised that the duty to cooperate fails to provide 
sufficient incentives within the planning system to encourage all local 
authorities to strive for collaborative approaches to strategic dilemmas. The 
government has vowed to ‘beef up’ the duty but it is unlikely that tweaking 
existing policy will be sufficient to fill the strategic spatial planning void. It 
is perhaps naive to assume that central government can conclusively solve 
the intractable conundrum of a comprehensive approach to sub-national 
governance in England without a constitutional settlement. Nevertheless, it is 
equally naive to assume that organic localist approaches will emerge in all 
localities to span the chasms within the current planning framework. In the 
autumn of 2015 a number of devolution deals were negotiated between 
government, city-regions and county-level groupings of authorities across 
England. It appears that in some areas (e.g. Greater Manchester and Sheffield) 
the new ‘soft spaces’ of governance will offer an opportunity for innovative 
forms of spatial planning to return to the policy agenda. A clear message from 
the government’s devolution approach is that ‘one size does not fit all’. It 
appears comfortable about iterative decentralisation and the emerging 
asymmetrical (patchwork quilt) system of devolved powers and governance 
approaches developing across England. The clear difference from regional 
spatial strategies is that spatial planning in the current government’s approach 
is non-mandatory. This raises a question about fragmentation in national 
spatial planning coverage which potentially could accentuate existing 
economic inequalities between successful places and lagging places, and 
make it more difficult to resolve the national housing crisis (Colomb and 
Tomaney, 2015). 
Ultimately, there are still many questions to be answered relating to the 
government’s ‘devolution revolution’. Currently the approach contains 
insufficient contextual detail and if the experiences of negotiating RSSs are 
a precedent, the requirement to achieve unanimous political support from 
 the ‘combined authority cabinet’ for a spatial strategy to proceed could 
prove challenging. Nevertheless, the kaleidoscope of governance in England 
has been decisively shaken, and a new constellation of actors is emerging 
in the ‘soft spaces’ of sub-national governance. It will take time for the new 
structures to settle, and for some the reality of localism may match the 
rhetoric. However, critical questions of social equity arise: what is the future 
for those places that struggle to respond to the opportunities of localism 
and/or those places where local political rivalries implode? Equally, the 
financing formula for combined authorities is another major question which 
requires clarification. Concerns are being expressed about unequal financial 
settlements in the new funding environment and whether all new emerging 
sub-national governance structures around the country will be adequately 
resourced to rise to the holistic (economic, social and environmental) spatial 
planning challenges. Again, does central government have the capacity 
to engage? If some form of spatial planning is to comprehensively return to 
the English planning landscape, will additional resources be forthcoming to 
bolster the depleted ranks of public-sector planners or will those few 
remaining local authority planners be expected to expand their workload to 
deliver the new era of spatial plans? Ultimately, it seems localism will allow 
some forms of spatial planning to resume in England, but the extent to which 
the English spatial planning conundrum will be resolved is still a matter for 
much enquiry, empirical research and debate.
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